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A	U-turn	on	a	hard	Brexit	should	not	be	entirely
disregarded
Britain’s	recent	General	Election	and	its	unanticipated	outcome	marks	the	latest	chapter	in	the
political	turbulence	that	has	characterised	the	last	twelve	months	since	the	EU	referendum.
Tim	Oliver	argues	that	the	election	was	not	in	fact	about	Brexit,	although	it	does	now	leave	the
timing	of	Brexit	in	flux.	
	
Much	ink	has	been	spilt	explaining	one	of	the	most	unexpected	and	unpredictable	elections	in	British	history.
Suffice	to	say	that	little	went	according	to	plan	for	many	involved,	not	least	for	those	expecting	it	to	be	an	‘Elexit’,
a	general	election	in	which	Brexit	would	be	at	the	forefront	of	debate.
Brexit	was	of	course	debated,	but	the	underlying	drivers	behind	why	people	voted	as	they	did	lay	more	in
domestic	politics	than	the	question	of	Europe.
It’s	a	reminder	of	how	the	referendum	itself	was	not	simply	about	Britain’s	place	in	the	EU.		As	I	asked	in	a
January	2015	article	for	International	Affairs,	‘To	be	or	not	to	be	in	Europe:	is	that	the	question?’	The	short
answer:	no,	because	the	question	of	Europe	in	British	politics	is	multifaceted,	connects	to	so	many	aspects	of
British	life,	and	–	as	is	often	the	case	with	referendums	–	it	became	a	vote	on	a	whole	host	of	issues.
The	Elexit	that	never	was	therefore	leaves	two	questions	overhanging	British	politics	and	Brexit.
A	PM	on	Political	Death	Row?
How	long	can	May’s	government	survive?	Losing	the	majority	she	inherited	from	David	Cameron	–	thanks	to	one
of	the	Conservative	party’s	worst	ever	election	campaigns	–	has	left	May	a	dead	woman	walking.	However,	with
no	immediate	obvious	replacement	from	within	the	Conservative	party,	she	is	stuck	on	political	death	row	in	10
Downing	Street.
Immediately	after	the	election	she	was	forced	to	lose	her	two	closest	advisers,	both	widely	blamed	for	the
disastrous	campaign.	Demands	for	their	departure	also	reflected	anger	that	had	been	building	within	the
Conservative	party	–	including	amongst	ministers	–	at	their	and	May’s	arrogant,	highhanded	and	controlling
approach	to	running	government.
Such	an	approach	might	have	worked	when	May	was	in	charge	of	the	Home	Office,	a	department	notorious	for
problems	and	high-profile	mistakes.	As	prime	minister,	however,	it	has	been	a	recipe	for	building	resentment	and
policy	mistakes,	such	as	the	disastrous	policy	on	care	for	the	elderly	on	which	May	was	forced	to	perform	a	U-
turn	mid-campaign.
She	now	appears	unfit	to	run	a	government	and	a	country	where	compromise	and	consensus	building	will	be
crucial.	Rumours	abound	that	negotiations	to	secure	the	support	of	the	Northern	Ireland	DUP	have	been	strained
by	May’s	–	and,	it	musty	be	said,	some	Conservative	cabinet	ministers’	–	arrogance	and	indifference	to
compromise	in	negotiations.
A	Prime	Minister	once	lauded	as	not	being	one	for	the	bars	of	Westminster	and	rising	above	the	cliquey	politics	of
Cameronites	or	Blairites,	now	finds	herself	without	a	core	group	of	supporters	as	she	begins	the	most	difficult
negotiations	the	UK	has	ever	undertaken	in	peacetime.
This	then	is	a	government	set	to	struggle	to	get	domestic	and	Brexit	legislation	through	parliament,	to	say	nothing
of	the	challenge	to	reach	agreement	with	other	power	centres	such	as	the	Scottish	Government	and	the	City	of
London.	It	was	hardly	surprising	that	the	Queen’s	Speech	was	bereft	of	much	that	the	Conservative	party	had	set
out	in	its	election	manifesto.
LSE Brexit: A U-turn on a hard Brexit should not be entirely disregarded Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-13
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/07/13/a-u-turn-on-a-hard-brexit-should-not-be-entirely-disregarded/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Britain,	it	should	be	remembered,	can	be	a	country	where	big	projects	and	ideas	run	into	massive	political	and
administrative	obstacles.	For	example,	despite	repeated	attempts	and	never-ending	debates,	in	its	40	years	of
EU	membership	Britain	has	only	managed	to	build	one	new	airport	runway	(in	Manchester	in	the	1990s).
The	prospect	of	another	election	then	is	very	real,	despite	a	desire	by	all	–	and	not	least	by	sections	of	a	weary
British	public	–	to	avoid	one.	Labour	sense	they	might	make	a	break	through	and	hence	are	likely	to	back	the
necessary	parliamentary	votes	required	to	call	an	election.
It	means	calculations	about	domestic	politics	dominate	proceedings,	not	least	those	surrounding	internal	party
politics,	leaders’	strengths	and	weaknesses,	and	the	situation	in	Scotland	or	Northern	Ireland.	Brexit	risks
becoming	for	some	an	irritating	background	factor	they	would	rather	ignore.
Brexit	on	Political	Death	Row?
Where	then	does	this	leave	Brexit?	For	the	time	being,	HM	Government	remains	committed	to	the	Brexit	that	May
set	out	in	a	speech	in	January	2017.	Her	much	derided	statement	that	‘Brexit	means	Brexit’	was	actually	a	clear
statement	of	her	intent:	the	UK	would	leave	the	EU	with	no	ifs	or	buts	about	it.
All	that	was	to	exist	following	the	exit	was	a	free	trade	agreement	and	practical	but	limited	arrangements	in	areas
such	as	security	and	data	sharing.	EEA	membership	or	some	sort	of	‘soft	Brexit’	was	not	on	the	table,	except
perhaps	as	a	small	part	of	a	transitional	deal.
While	this	remains	formal	government	policy,	parliamentary	arithmetic	means	that	debates	and	decisions	about
Brexit	can	no	longer	be	confined	to	the	Conservative	party.	Labour’s	position	and	that	of	other	opposition	parties,
the	behaviour	of	the	House	of	Lords	(where	no	party	has	held	a	majority	since	1999)	and	the	views	of	other
power	centres	such	as	the	Scottish	Parliament	now	matter	far	more	than	they	did	before	the	9	June,	or	usually	do
in	UK	politics.
It	means	that	Parliament	–	and	more	specifically	the	House	of	Commons	–	is	confronted	with	the	unenviable	task
of	trying	to	decipher	what	it	was	the	British	people	voted	for	in	a	referendum	which,	as	already	noted,	was	not
entirely	about	Britain’s	membership	of	the	EU.
Let	us	not	forget	that	the	referendum	was	called	to	settle	tensions	within	the	Conservative	party,	tensions	also
found	in	other	parties	including	Labour.	So	too	was	the	general	election	called	by	May	in	order	to	secure	a
mandate	for	her	interpretation	of	what	the	British	people	had	voted	for,	thus	ensuring	that	Parliament	–	and	some
of	her	more	pro-European	backbenchers	–	could	not	change	or	challenge	this.
But	the	British	people	have	not	spoken	clearly	on	the	matter	and	British	politicians	remain	paralysed	over	what	to
do	about	it.	Such	is	the	level	of	confusion	and	inability	amongst	the	political	elite	to	face	the	choices	ahead	that
the	Centre	for	European	Reform	recently	called	on	the	rest	of	the	EU	to	help	Britain	along	by	confronting	its
politicians	and	public	with	the	Brexit	choices	they	refuse	to	face.
Such	a	situation	might	seem	absurd	to	the	rest	of	Europe.	The	despair	and	angst	at	a	‘hung	parliament’
expressed	by	some	in	the	UK	can	sound	bizarre	when	across	Europe	and	large	swathes	of	the	democratic	world
a	hung	parliament	is	perfectly	normal.	But	here	we	hit	on	a	problem	underlying	the	whole	situation:	Britain’s
tradition	of	majoritarian	politics.
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Deeply	embedded	in	Britain’s	political	psyche	is	an	obsession	with	one	party	winning	a	majority	in	the	House	of
Commons,	almost	always	on	a	minority	of	the	vote	thanks	to	the	First	Past	the	Post	electoral	system.
The	domination	of	politics	and	government	that	emerges	does	not	mean	the	governing	party	ignores	parliament
and	goes	about	governing	without	any	checks	on	its	powers.	Consultation	and	dialogue	are	frequent,	albeit	often
hidden	from	view.	Constitutional	change	also	means	that	such	political	actors	as	devolved	parliaments,	the
Supreme	Court,	and	the	Mayor	of	London	have	to	be	taken	into	account.
It	does,	however,	mean	the	system	struggles	when	faced	with	the	need	for	public	consensus	and	united
leadership.	Despite	the	2010-15	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government,	the	idea	of	coalition
remains	a	difficult	one.	Most	Britons	have	never	heard	of	such	arrangements	as	Germany’s	grand	coalitions	and
would	struggle	to	believe	they	really	happen.
Brexit	might	have	led	to	repeated	calls	for	some	form	of	unified	way	forward.	Even	the	leading	Leave	campaigner
Michael	Gove,	speaking	the	day	after	the	EU	referendum,	called	for	such	an	approach.	Other	ideas	include	a
cross-party	commission.
Any	such	consensus	looks	unlikely	in	a	system	geared	to	public	confrontation,	especially	when	the	Conservatives
and	Labour	have	abandoned	the	middle	ground	of	British	politics	in	favour	of	extremes	on	the	right	and	left.
That	does	not	mean	consensus	building	might	not	happen.	The	election	result	means	May’s	approach	of	defining
Brexit	according	to	what	she	wanted	has	been	checked,	but	it	is	not	checkmate.	Reversing	Brexit	remains	a	very
difficult	and	unlikely	outcome.
However	the	suggestion	of	a	U-turn	on	Brexit	should	not	be	entirely	disregarded;	the	volatile	state	of	British,
European	and	Western	politics	means	we	simply	cannot	dismiss	such	a	possibility.	That	said,	were	such	an
eventuality	to	occur,	it	would	require	either	a	referendum	or	another	general	election	in	which	a	new	government
is	elected	with	a	clear	mandate	to	reverse	–	or	at	least	try	to	reverse	–	Article	50.
What	the	rest	of	the	EU	faces	is	the	possibility	of	more	flexibility	on	the	UK’s	part	in	the	three	sets	of	UK-EU	Brexit
negotiations:	over	the	UK’s	exit,	a	transition,	and	the	new	UK-EU	relationship.	As	things	stand,	the	most	likely
outcome	might	be	a	soft	transition	to	a	hard	Brexit.	How	long	that	will	actually	take	remains	uncertain.
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None	of	this	changes	what	in	Britain	is	often	the	most	overlooked	side	of	the	negotiations:	securing	the
agreement	of	the	other	27	EU	member	states	and	EU	institutions.	Britain’s	politicians	and	public	have	struggled	to
debate	what	they	want	Brexit	to	mean.	They	have	paid	next	to	no	attention	to	what	the	rest	of	the	EU	might	agree
to.
This	article	first	appeared	on	the	Dahrendorf	Forum	blog	and	it	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position
of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
Dr	Tim	Oliver	is	an	Associate	at	LSE	IDEAS,	a	Teaching	Fellow	at	UCL	and	Director	of	Research	at	Brexit
Analytics.
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